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ALGORITHMIC RISK ASSESSMENTS AND THE 
DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD OF YOUTH 
 
MEGAN T. STEVENSON* & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN** 
INTRODUCTION 
Risk assessment algorithms—statistical formulas that predict the 
likelihood a person will commit crime in the future—are used across the 
country to help make life-altering decisions in the criminal process, 
including setting bail, determining sentences, selecting probation 
conditions, and deciding parole.1 Yet many of these instruments are “black-
box” tools. The algorithms they use are secret, both to the sentencing 
authorities who rely on them and to the offender whose life is affected. The 
opaque nature of these tools raises numerous legal and ethical concerns. In 
this paper we argue that risk assessment algorithms obfuscate how certain 
factors, usually considered mitigating by sentencing authorities, can lead to 
higher risk scores and thus inappropriately inflate sentences. We illustrate 
this phenomenon through one of its most dramatic manifestations: The role 
of age in risk assessment algorithms.2 
When considered as a factor at sentencing, youthfulness can be a double-
edged sword—it can both enhance risk and diminish blameworthiness. If 
either risk or culpability is the sole issue at sentencing, this potential conflict 
is avoided. But when, as is often the case, both risk and culpability are 
considered relevant to the sentence, the aggravating effect of youth should 
presumably be offset or perhaps eliminated entirely by its mitigating impact. 
If judges and parole authorities are fully informed of the conflicting roles 
youth plays in a particular case, they can engage in this balancing act as 
appropriate. However, when information about risk comes from a black-box 
                                                 
*  Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University. 
**  Milton Underwood Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. The authors would like to thank 
Brandon Garrett, Issa Kohler-Hausman, Sandra Mayson, David Robinson, Hannah Jane Sassaman, and 
Nicholas Scurich for their comments on earlier drafts of this article.  
1. PAMELA M. CASEY ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, USING OFFENDER RISK AND 
NEEDS ASSESSMENT INFORMATION AT SENTENCING (2011) (describing how magistrates, correctional 
officials and judges use actuarial risk assessment instruments in deciding whether to grant bail or parole 
and in determining offenders’ “criminogenic needs” when imposing sentence). 
2. Other factors that might be considered both risk-aggravating and blame-mitigating include 
mental illness, substance abuse and lack of education. See infra text accompanying notes 95–97. 
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algorithm, they are unlikely to know the extent to which the risk evaluation 
is influenced by the defendant’s youthfulness. In such cases, their decisions 
about pretrial detention, sentence, or release may unknowingly give youth 
too much weight as an aggravator.  
Further, even if the black box is opened and the risk assessment 
algorithm is made publicly available, the risk score may not be conveyed in 
a fully transparent manner. For instance, while judges may be told that an 
offender’s youth is a risk factor, the relative weight of age in the overall 
score may not be fully explained or understood at the time of decision-
making.3 Unless the judge makes specific inquiries, she will not be informed 
of the variables that contributed most heavily to a particular defendant’s risk 
score.  
This decisional blindness is especially pernicious in light of the 
impression created by the labels associated with these instruments—“high 
risk” or “high risk of violence.” Such labels not only convey information 
about the potential for recidivism. They are also suggestive of bad character, 
or at least a history of bad decision-making. In other words, these labels 
convey condemnation. Such condemnation might be appropriate for an 
individual who has earned the “high-risk” classification by committing 
multiple violent or ruthless acts. But it is not warranted for an individual 
who has earned that label largely because of his or her youth. 
To ensure sentencers take this double-edged sword problem into account, 
risk assessment algorithms should be transparent about the factors that most 
heavily influence the score. Only in that way can courts and legislators 
engage in an explicit discussion about whether, and to what extent, young 
age should be considered a mitigator or an aggravator in fashioning criminal 
punishment.  
In Part I, we discuss the tensions youthfulness generates in the post-
conviction setting by introducing the double-edge sword phenomenon and 
the jurisprudence that has developed around it. In Part II, we present 
empirical evidence that shows how influential age is in the widely-used 
COMPAS Violent Recidivism Risk Score (VRRS) and in other common 
risk assessment tools. Specifically, we conduct a partial decomposition of 
the VRRS to show that age alone can explain almost 60% of its variation, 
substantially more than the contributions of criminal history, gender or race. 
Similar patterns are documented in other common risk scores. In Part III, 
we discuss how obfuscation of age’s impact on the risk score improperly 
undermines consideration of youthfulness as a mitigating factor. We also 
discuss how the points we make about the role of youth might apply to a 
                                                 
3. See infra text accompanying notes 84–86. 
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number of other factors that are often used in structured risk assessments, 
including mental illness, substance abuse, and socio-economic factors. 
While our discussion centers on sentencing, the main argument is generally 
relevant to a broad range of settings in which risk assessments influence 
criminal justice outcomes. 
I. THE ROLE OF YOUTH IN SENTENCING 
Reliance on youth at sentencing can raise at least three issues that 
resonate with constitutional prohibitions. The first is whether basing a 
sentence in whole or in part on youth raises an equal protection claim. Some 
have argued that age classifications, like those based on gender and race, 
should be subject to heightened scrutiny.4 The second arises from the notion, 
recently solidified by the Supreme Court into constitutional doctrine where 
race is involved, that punishment should not be based on status.5 Although 
both of these issues require careful thought, neither is addressed here. 
The focus of this article will instead be on a third issue: how youth is 
used in conflicting ways at sentencing, and the reasons—arguably also of 
constitutional magnitude—that such use is questionable. This focus requires 
an examination of the “double-edged sword” dilemma, and the ways in 
which courts have dealt with it. While the issues discussed in this article 
relate to both the juvenile justice system and the adult criminal justice 
system, we focus our analysis exclusively on the adult system and adult risk 
assessment tools. Thus, when we refer to youths, we are referring only to 
those in their late teens and early twenties who are initially prosecuted in 
adult court, and to those under the age of eighteen who have been transferred 
to the adult system.  
A. Youth as a Double-Edged Sword 
In the American legal system, youth is often a strong basis for leniency 
in punishment. The most obvious evidence of this stance is the fact that 
every state has established a juvenile court system that diverts young 
offenders away from the harshness of adult criminal justice.6 In adult 
                                                 
4. Cf. Nina A. Cohn, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Age Discrimination: A Challenge to a 
Decades-Old Consensus, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 213, 231 (2010) (focusing on protections for the 
elderly). 
5. See Buck v. Davis, 137 S.Ct. 759, 778 (2017).  
6. Barry C. Feld, Juvenile Justice, in 1 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE: INTRODUCTION AND 
CRIMINALIZATION 329, 330 (Erik Luna ed., 2017). 
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sentencing regimes as well, youth is often treated as a mitigator, which in 
some situations is even constitutionally required. In Roper v. Simmons,7 the 
Supreme Court held that the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile 
offenders who have been transferred to adult court violates the Eighth 
Amendment. Seven years later, in Miller v. Alabama,8 it concluded that the 
Eighth Amendment also bars mandatory life without parole sentences for 
juvenile offenders. In both decisions, the Court emphasized the inverse 
relationship between adolescence and culpability. As Justice Kagan put it in 
Miller, “[b]ecause juveniles have diminished culpability and greater 
prospects for reform, . . . ‘they are less deserving of the most severe 
punishments.”9 Subsequent developments have made clear that the 
thousands of minors who are transferred out of the juvenile system and 
subject to sentences short of the death penalty and life without parole are 
also explicitly encompassed by the mitigation rationale developed in the 
Supreme Court’s decisions.10  
The Supreme Court’s decisions draw a bright line at the age of eighteen. 
But the rationale of Roper and its progeny clearly does not evaporate at that 
age. Influenced by those cases, some jurisdictions have recently expanded 
juvenile court jurisdiction beyond eighteen.11 More importantly, well before 
Roper, most capital sentencing statutes treated young (post-adolescent) 
adulthood as a mitigating factor when deciding whether the death penalty is 
appropriate.12 A similar practice has long existed in non-capital sentencing 
practice. For instance, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines state that “age 
(including youth) may be relevant in determining whether a departure is 
warranted, if considerations based on age, individually or in combination 
                                                 
7. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
8. 567 U.S. 460 (2012). 
9. 567 U.S. at 471 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010)). 
10. See Feld, supra note 6, at 382 (stating that “states annually try upward of 200,000 chronological 
juveniles as adults” and noting that the Court’s kids-are-different jurisprudence applies to such 
offenders, although it provides them only “limited relief”). 
11. Merril Sobie, The State of American Juvenile Justice, ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MAGAZINE, 
Spring 2018, at 26, 27.  
12. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B)(4) (LexisNexis 2018); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-
3-207(4)(e) (LexisNexis 2018); see generally, Jeffrey Kirchmeier, A Tear in the Eye of the Law: 
Mitigating Factors and the Progression Toward a Disease Theory of Criminal Justice, 83 OR. L. REV. 
631, 673–75 n.226 (2004) (listing relevant statutes and caselaw). Cf. Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 
367 (1993) (“There is no dispute that a defendant’s youth is a relevant mitigating circumstance that must 
be within the effective reach of a capital sentencing jury if death sentence is to meet [constitutional 
requirements].”). 
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with other offender characteristics, are present to an unusual degree and 
distinguish the case from the typical cases covered by the guidelines.”13 
State regimes are often even more explicit about making post-adolescent 
youth a mitigating consideration at sentencing.14 
At the same time, intuition suggests—and research indicates15—that 
youthfulness can also be an aggravating factor. The Supreme Court has 
often observed that juveniles are less “deterrable” than adults.16 Although 
that language is meant to support the Court’s conclusion that youth is a 
mitigating factor, it also recognizes that young people tend to be more 
impulsive, less risk averse, more easily influenced by peers, and less 
constrained by “stakes in life”—all of which tend to increase the likelihood 
that young people will engage in criminal activity.17 If the goal is to prevent 
crime via incapacitation, one might argue that it is logical to incarcerate 
youths through the years of peak criminal activity. 
As a legal matter, these facts give rise to the familiar “double-edged 
sword” problem.18 Depending upon the purpose of punishment at issue, the 
same factor can be seen as either mitigating or aggravating. Because they 
diminish culpability and control, factors like youth and mental disability 
may well be mitigating from a retributive or deterrence perspective. From 
an incapacitative perspective, however, they may be aggravating factors, 
because they enhance risk.  
Sentencing practices reflect this tension. In a meta-analysis of 
approximately 60 studies examining the effect of age on sentences, Jaejong 
Wu and Cassia Spohn found that 40% of the studies reported a positive 
relationship between these two variables (i.e., older offenders received 
longer sentences), 57% reported a negative relationship, and 3% reported 
                                                 
13. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2016). 
14. For instance, a number of states have “youthful offender” provisions that call for more lenient 
treatment of offenders tried in adult court who are under a certain age (e.g., 21 or 25). See, e.g., FLA. 
STAT. § 958.04; GA. CODE. ANN. § 42-7-2; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-148 (West 2018). 
15. See, e.g., John Monahan, Jennifer Skeem & Christopher Lowencamp, Age and Risk 
Assessment, and Sanctioning: Overestimating the Old, Underestimating the Young (2017), at http:// 
www.ssrn.com/abstract=2973503 [https://perma.cc/FS24-7D94]. 
16. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005) (“the same characteristics that render 
juveniles less culpable than adults suggest as well that juveniles will be less susceptible to deterrence.”); 
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 72 (2010) (same); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012) (same). 
17. See generally Christopher Slobogin & Mark R. Fondacaro, Juveniles at Risk: A Plea for 
Preventive Justice 19–28 (2011) (describing the research). 
18. See, e.g., Rabindranath Ramana, Living and Dying with a Double-Edge Sword: Mental Health 
Evidence in the Tenth Circuit’s Capital Cases, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 339 (2011). 
 
 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
686 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [VOL. 96:681 
 
 
 
 
no relationship at all.19 Wu and Spohn concluded that federal courts are 
more likely to treat youth as a mitigator than state courts, and that northern 
courts are more likely than southern states to treat youth as an aggravator.20 
The obvious legal question that arises from these observations is whether 
this differential use of youth at sentencing is permissible.  
B. A Double-Edged Jurisprudence 
At the most fundamental level, the role of youth in sentencing should be 
consistent with the relevant jurisdiction’s sentencing policy. Using youth as 
an aggravator might be considered impermissible in a sentencing regime 
that is driven largely by retributive goals.21 However, youth might 
permissibly be considered both an aggravator and a mitigator in sentencing 
regimes that are based on amalgams of retribution, deterrence, reformation, 
and individual prevention goals.22  
In the latter regimes, judges who want to take seriously the sentencing 
impact of youthful characteristics will have to exercise a considerable 
degree of judgement. Take, for instance, a case involving a highly impulsive 
youth; as the Supreme Court’s cases indicate, impulsivity can be both 
aggravating and mitigating. Faced with this situation, a judge might decide 
that such an offender is high risk, and also conclude that his ability to reason 
rationally is not so impaired as to require leniency, thus leading to a sentence 
enhancement. Or consider an offender whose youthful desire to please 
others both increases his risk level and decreases his culpability. Here a 
judge might conclude that the risk posed by the offender’s vulnerability to 
peer pressure is relatively minimal and in any event treatable in the 
community, and that this fact, together with the offender’s unformed 
character, permits a more lenient sentence. 
Carrying out this nuanced type of analysis is difficult and subjective.  
Furthermore, it may be problematic on constitutional grounds. One of the 
reasons that people with intellectual disability are exempted from the death 
                                                 
19. Jaejong Wu & Cassia Spohn, Does an Offender’s Age Have an Effect on Sentence Length?: A 
Meta-Analytic Review, 20 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 379 (2009). 
20. However, Wu and Spohn also note that these disparities were less evident in those studies that 
did a better job controlling for other variables. Id. at 391. 
21. See generally Richard Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67 (2005) (describing 
different sentencing systems, their rationales, and examples of each).  
22. Id.   
 
 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol96/iss3/6
  
 
 
 
 
2018] ALGORITHMIC RISK ASSESSMENT 687 
 
 
 
 
penalty is because the Supreme Court wanted to avoid the double-edged 
sword problem. In Atkins v. Virginia,23 the Supreme Court expressed 
concern that intellectual disability “can be a two-edged sword that may 
enhance the likelihood that the aggravating factor of future dangerousness 
will be found by the jury.”24 In other words, the Atkins majority suggested 
that intellectual disability should be treated solely as a mitigator, and 
fashioned a holding that assured that result. The Court has voiced a similar 
sentiment in connection with mental illness. In Zant v. Stephens it favorably 
noted the fact that Georgia’s capital sentencing statute had not “attached the 
‘aggravating’ label to . . . conduct that actually should militate in favor of a 
lesser penalty, such as perhaps the defendant’s mental illness.”25 In short, 
given the Roper line of cases establishing the mitigating relevance of youth, 
and the doubled-edge sword concerns expressed in Atkins and Zant, one 
could interpret current doctrine as suggesting that youth should never be 
treated as an aggravator. 
There are arguments to the contrary, however, and the issue remains 
unresolved.26 In the meantime, courts not only must grapple with the fact 
that youth can be both a risk-aggravator and a blame-mitigator, but also with 
an even more insidious double-edged sword problem. The problem is well-
illustrated by Huckaby v. Florida,27 which dealt with not with age, but with 
mental illness, a factor that, like age, can be relevant both to risk and to 
culpability. In Huckaby, a capital case, the trial court found that the 
defendant was suffering from a serious mental illness at the time of the 
offense, and thus had proven a statutory mitigator based on limited 
culpability.28 However, the court still sentenced Huckaby to death, based in 
part on its conclusion that the murder had been committed in a heinous 
manner, a statutory aggravator under Florida law that posits that murders 
committed in a horrific manner are especially blameworthy.29 On appeal, 
the Florida Supreme Court did not dispute the murder was carried out in a 
gruesome manner. Nonetheless, it reversed the sentence, finding that “[t]he 
heinous and atrocious manner in which this crime was perpetrated . . . [was] 
the direct consequence of [Huckaby’s] mental illness, so far as the record 
reveals.”30 The higher court concluded, rightly in our view, that Huckaby’s 
mental illness could not both mitigate blame and aggravate it. 
                                                 
23. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
24. Id. at 321. 
25. 462 U.S. 862, 885 (1983). 
26. See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE: LAWS THAT DEPRIVE PEOPLE OF MENTAL 
DISABILITY OF LIFE AND LIBERTY 90–92 (2006).  
27. 343 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 1977). 
28. Id. at 34. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
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 Similarly, even if youth can be both a risk-aggravator and a culpability-
mitigator, presumably all agree that youth cannot be a culpability-
aggravator. Youth is a life stage that everyone passes through and over 
which an individual has no control. There is nothing blameworthy about 
being young. Yet when judges are unaware of the impact that youthfulness 
plays in the risk score, there is a danger of engaging in the sort of illegitimate 
double-edged swordism demonstrated in Huckaby. That is because it is easy 
to associate a high risk label not just with dangerousness but also with bad 
character and condemnation. If that conflation occurs, youth can end up not 
only legitimately enhancing risk but also illegitimately enhancing 
culpability. We will return to this topic in Part III. For now, enough has been 
said to set the stage for a discussion of recent developments connected with 
risk assessment that have made the multiple potential roles of youth in 
sentencing an increasingly pressing issue.  
II. YOUTH AS A RISK FACTOR: AN ANALYSIS OF THE COMPAS 
In the past decade, a number of states have moved toward “evidence-
based sentencing.”31 This type of sentencing instructs sentencing authorities 
to rely as much as possible on risk assessment and risk management 
instruments that structure the inquiry into an offender’s dangerousness and 
treatability. Proponents of such tools argue that they can improve the ability 
to choose between incarceration, some intermediate community sanction, or 
complete release. Some of these instruments are strictly actuarial, meaning 
that they include only risk factors that are statistically-correlated with risk 
and produce numerical probability estimates of risk. Other instruments 
provide a more qualitative assessment, but still require a structured inquiry 
informed by the empirical literature on risk assessment and risk 
management.32  
One of the more popular risk assessment instruments is the COMPAS 
(for Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative 
Sanctions), developed by a company called Equivant (formerly 
Northpointe). The COMPAS algorithms were first developed in 1998 and 
                                                 
31. See generally Cecelia Klingele, The Promises and Perils of Evidence-Based Corrections, 91 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 537, 566–67 (2015). 
32. For a detailed account of some of the more popular instruments, see RANDY K. OTTO & KEVIN 
S. DOUGLAS, HANDBOOK OF VIOLENCE RISK ASSESSMENT (2d ed. 2018). 
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have been revised several times since then.33 Although originally designed 
to aid the departments of corrections in placing, managing, and treating 
offenders, it has since been used in other contexts, including pretrial 
decision-making, sentencing, and parole.34  
The COMPAS has two primary risk models: General Recidivism Risk 
and Violent Recidivism Risk.35 As the names suggest, the former model is 
a general predictor of future offending while the latter model predicts 
violent reoffending. While Equivant provides general information about the 
factors that are included, the exact algorithm is proprietary.  
The COMPAS algorithm has stepped into the spotlight several times in 
recent years. It was integral to a 2016 case, State v. Loomis,36 in which the 
petitioner argued that consideration of the COMPAS algorithm in 
determining his sentence violated his due process rights in three ways. First, 
the petitioner argued that because the algorithm is proprietary, defendants 
are unable to discern and challenge its scientific validity. Second, he 
contended that a sentence based on an algorithm derived from group data is 
not “individualized.” And third, the petitioner argued that the COMPAS 
algorithm impermissibly takes gender into account.37 Although the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court admonished lower courts to be aware of these 
concerns and avoid making the COMPAS score determinative,38 it rejected 
all three challenges and affirmed Loomis’s sentence of fifteen to twenty 
years, ten to fifteen years of which had been added by the trial court because 
of the risk he posed.39 
Scholars and journalists have also paid special attention to the COMPAS 
algorithm. In 2017, the public advocacy organization ProPublica accused 
the COMPAS algorithm of being biased against black defendants.40 This 
critique spawned an active discussion about the definitions of racial fairness 
in algorithms.41 Similarly, a recent paper challenged the predictive 
                                                 
33. Id. at 2. 
34. Erin Collins, Punishing Risk, GEO. L. J. (forthcoming May 2018) at 31. 
35. Northpointe, Practitioner’s Guide to COMPAS, August 17, 2012 at 1. 
36. 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wisc. 2016). 
37. Id. at 761–62 (upholding the use of the COMPAS tool in sentencing in Wisconsin) 
38. Id. at 276. 
39. Id. at 282. 
40. See Jeff Larson et al., How We Analyzed the COMPAS Recidivism Algorithm, at 1 (2017), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/how-we-analyzed-the-compas-recidivism-algorithm [https://perma. 
cc/REP7-T8G5] (describing the COMPAS as one of “two leading nationwide tools offered by 
commercial vendors”). 
41. See e.g. Jon Kleinberg et al., Inherent Tradeoffs in the Fair Determination of Risk Scores, 
PROCEEDINGS OF INNOVATIONS IN COMPUTER SCIENCE (November 17, 2016), 
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superiority of the COMPAS algorithm by claiming to show that a group of 
random online survey respondents given only 7 data points could predict 
recidivism as well as the COMPAS algorithm.42 
 Such events have generated considerable popular interest in the 
COMPAS algorithm. In this article, we open still another line of inquiry 
about the instrument, by examining the relative explanatory power of 
factors used in the COMPAS algorithm. While ProPublica’s critique 
focused on the role of race in COMPAS, and the Loomis case focused on 
the COMPAS’s use of gender, we examine the role that age plays in that 
instrument, and find that age contributes much more explanatory power than 
either of these factors. Indeed, we find that age contributes substantially 
more to the sentencing recommendations produced by the COMPAS 
Violent Recidivism Risk Score than any other variable. After explicating 
that conclusion, we look at several similar instruments and find that 
COMPAS is not unique in heavily weighting age; many other risk 
assessment algorithms also lean substantially on youthfulness when 
predicting recidivism. 
A. Age in the COMPAS Violent Recidivism Risk Score 
Equivant has publicly stated that the factors included in the COMPAS 
Violence Recidivism Risk Score (VRRS) consist of age at assessment, age 
at first adjudication, the History of Violence Scale, the History of 
Noncompliance Scale, and the Vocational Educational Scale.43 The 
company says nothing about the extent to which each factor contributes to 
these scores, or how the various scales are constructed. 
While the exact algorithm that constitutes the VRRS is secret, its 
construction can be at least partially deciphered through reverse 
engineering. As used here, reverse engineering refers to a process of 
evaluating the importance of a particular factor within a risk score by 
                                                 
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1609.05807.pdf [https://perma.cc/VET3-YEW7] (showing that, except in very 
specialized circumstances, achieving equal false positive rates for two groups with different base rates 
for criminal activity would require a risk tool to assign the same risk classification to different levels of 
actual risk across the two groups). 
42. Julia Dressel & Hany Farid, The Accuracy, Fairness and Limits of Predicting Recidivism, 
SCIENCE ADVANCES 1, 1 (2018).   
43. See William Dieterich et. al., COMPAS Risk Scales: Demonstrating Accuracy and Predictive 
Parity, Performance of the COMPAS Risk Scales in Broward County, Northpointe Inc., Research 
Department, Jul. 8, 2016, at 5–6. 
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determining how much of the variation in the score can be explained by that 
factor.44 A complete reverse-engineering would allow explanation of 100% 
of the variation in VRRS: all of the factors that contribute to the score, as 
well as the weights on these factors, would be known. Here, given the 
inability to access all the relevant data on which the COMPAS relies, we 
are only able to partially reverse-engineer the algorithm. But, with that 
caveat, our model explains 72% of the variation in VRRS, and allows us to 
identify factors that contribute substantially to the overall score.  
We conducted our analysis of the VRRS using a data set of risk scores 
acquired by ProPublica as part of its study on racial bias in risk algorithms 
in Florida.45 Through a public records request, ProPublica received two 
years’ worth (2013–2014) of COMPAS risk scores from the Sherriff’s 
Office in Broward County.46 Since COMPAS is predominantly used to 
determine pretrial custody in that jurisdiction, scores generated at other 
stages—such as parole and probation determinations—were dropped from 
the analysis.47 Using name and date of birth, the risk scores were matched 
to public criminal records from the Broward County Clerk’s Office 
Website, jail records from Broward County’s Sherriff’s Office, and public 
incarceration records from the Florida Department of Corrections website.48 
The data provided by ProPublica also contained information on each 
defendant’s age (in years), race, gender, current charge, degree of current 
charge, number of prior arrests, and number of juvenile felony, 
misdemeanor, and “other” arrests. We supplemented these data with 
publicly available information on prior incarceration from the Florida 
Department of Corrections website.49 Incarceration data was matched to the 
ProPublica data using first name, last name, and birthdate.50 Thus the final 
data set tracks criminal history, demographics, and COMPAS risk scores 
for all defendants who received a COMPAS VRRS as part of pretrial 
processing between 2013 and 2014 in Broward County, Florida. 
 Table 1 describes the data. There are 4020 total cases, initiated on dates 
spanning the beginning of 2013 to the end of 2014. The average age of the 
                                                 
44. It is worth noting that this is a different empirical exercise than is often conducted with risk 
assessments; we are not trying determine how well the different factors predict recidivism, but rather 
how well they predict the COMPAS risk score. 
45. Larson et al., supra note 40. The data can be downloaded from https://github.com/propublica/ 
compas-analysis. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. These data can be downloaded at http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/obis_request.html; the data used 
in this paper was downloaded in October 2015. 
50. The incarceration data included both a dummy that is equal to one if the defendant has a prior 
incarceration in the state of Florida, as well as dummy variables for the specific security level of the 
facility. 
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defendants in the sample was 35; 36% of the defendants were white, 48% 
were black, and 9% were Hispanic; 79% of the defendants were male, and 
40% faced felony charges. 
           
Table 1. Description of the Data     
           
Variable Mean SD Min Max  Variable % SD Min Max 
Age 35.7 12.07 18 83  White 36 0.48 0 1 
Juvenile 
felony arrests 
0.04 0.43 0 20  Black 48 0.5 0 1 
Juvenile misd. 
arrests 
0.07 0.4 0 8  Hispanic 9 0.28 0 1 
Juvenile other 
arrests 
0.08 0.41 0 7  Male 79 0.41 0 1 
Number of 
prior arrests 
2.44 3.95 0 38  Felony 40 0.49 0 1 
           
VRRS
51
 2.44 0.86 0.37 5.18  Prior 
Incarceration 
7 0.25 0 1 
           
Note: This table contains descriptive statistics for the 4,020 cases used in the analysis. 
Using this data set, we examined the effect of seven different factors on 
COMPAS VRRS scores: age (our variable of interest),52 current charges, 
                                                 
51. The raw risk score in the data is negatively signed. To avoid the confusion associated with a 
negatively signed risk score, we added five so that all scores are positive. 
52. The age factor includes dummies for each age, rounded to the nearest year. The current charges 
factor includes dummies for the exact charge as well as dummies for the degree of the charge. The 
juvenile criminal history factor is as described in the next sentence in the text, and the race factor includes 
dummies for being black, white or Hispanic (mutually exclusive). The number of prior arrests factor 
includes dummies for the exact number of prior arrests. The prior incarceration factor includes a dummy 
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juvenile criminal history, race, number of prior arrests,53 prior incarceration, 
and gender. Some of these factors consist of a number of variables. For 
instance, the juvenile criminal history factor contains all the variables that 
pertain to juvenile justice: the number of juvenile felony arrests, juvenile 
misdemeanor arrests, and “other” juvenile arrests (probably consisting of 
juvenile-specific offenses, such as curfew violation).54 We then used several 
metrics to evaluate the extent to which each of these factors contribute to 
the risk score,55 all relating to a statistic called the adjusted R^2.56 
Specifically, we looked at each factor’s individual explanatory power 
(which does not take into account how the factors might interact),57 
marginal explanatory power (which does look at this interaction),58 and 
overall explanatory power.59 
Figure 1 shows the individual explanatory power of the seven factors we 
considered. As the figure indicates, age has substantially more individual 
explanatory power than any of the other factors. In fact, age alone explains 
57% of the variation in VRRS. 
 
                                                 
for whether or not the defendant had a prior period of incarceration in Florida, as well as dummies for 
the security level of the custody (close, community, medium, minimum). The gender variable is binary. 
53. The data provide information on the number of prior “counts” but do not specify what this word 
means. Here, we defer to Northpointe’s response to ProPublica, in which they refer to these as prior 
arrests. Deiterich, supra note 43, at 6 (stating that ProPublica “did include age and number of prior 
arrests in the data they posted”). 
54. More specifically, the juvenile justice factor includes a fully saturated set of dummy variables 
for each number of juvenile felony, misdemeanor and “other” arrests. 
55. We use the raw risk score, as provided in the file “compas-scores-raw.csv,” which is matched 
to the other files using name, date of birth, and date that the risk score was completed. Following the 
ProPublica analysis, cases where the COMPAS score was taken more than 30 days from the date of 
arrest (723 in total) were dropped.  
56. For a formal definition of adjusted R^2, see Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, INTRODUCTORY 
ECONOMETRICS A MODERN APPROACH 202 (5 ed. 2014). The R^2 is a statistical measure of how much 
of the total variation in the risk score is explained by that factor; the adjusted R^2 accounts for the 
number of variables in that factor. We focus on the R^2 instead of coefficient magnitudes for several 
reasons. First, coefficients can be large and statistically significant while still explaining only a relatively 
small portion of the variation. Second, some of the factors we consider consist of multiple variables; in 
fact, we chose to fully saturate the regressions, so as to avoid parametric assumptions about how, say, 
the number of prior arrests affects the score. A coefficient-based analysis would be hard to interpret. We 
could have considered the F statistic in a test of joint significance on multiple coefficients, but the R^2 
is a more intuitive and easily explainable metric 
57. The individual explanatory power of a factor refers to the adjusted R^2 in a linear regression 
of the VRRS on that factor individually. The individual explanatory power of the juvenile justice factor, 
for instance, includes not only the explanatory power of juvenile justice alone, but also some of the 
explanatory power of the factors with which it is correlated. 
58. The marginal explanatory power differs from the individual explanatory power in that it 
represents the amount of explanatory power one factor adds after all the other factors have been 
accounted for. This second measure is defined as the difference between the adjusted R^2s in two linear 
regressions: a regression of the VRRS on all factors including the factor under consideration, and a 
regression of the VRRS on all factors except the factor under consideration.   
59. The overall explanatory power is the adjusted R^2 from a regression of the VRRS on all factors 
or on various subsets of factors. 
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Figure 1: Individual Explanatory Powers of Various Factors on the 
COMPAS Violent Recidivism Score 
Note: This figure shows the adjusted R^2 in a regression of the raw 
Violent Recidivism Risk Score on each of the factors listed above. Each 
regression includes only one factor at a time, although the factors may 
consist of multiple variables. For instance, the individual explanatory power 
of age is the adjusted R^2 in a regression of the VRRS on a set of 63 dummy 
variables for each year of age found in the data. The adjustment to the R^2 
accounts for the number of regressors included in the model. 
 
Figure 2 shows the marginal explanatory power of each factor on the 
VRRS. Once again, age has substantially more explanatory power than any 
other factor under consideration. Even after accounting for criminal history, 
current charge, age, gender, and race, age explains 48% of the total 
variation. All of the other factors have a marginal explanatory power of 5% 
or less.  
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Figure 2: Marginal Explanatory Powers of Various Factors on the COMPAS 
Violent Recidivism Score 
 
Note: This figure shows the difference in the adjusted R^2 between two 
regressions: a regression of the raw VRRS on all of the factors and a 
regression of VRRS on all factors except the one listed in the leftmost 
column.  Thus, the marginal explanatory power of a factor is how much 
explanatory power is contributed after all other factors have been accounted 
for. The adjustment to the R^2 accounts for the number of regressors 
included in the model. 
 
In considering these findings, it must be recognized that the high 
marginal explanatory power of age could be due to the fact that age is 
correlated with other inputs to the VRRS that are not available in our data. 
While, as explained more fully below, the seven factors we were able to 
investigate account for a substantial portion of the total variation in the risk 
score, they do not account for everything. For instance, if we had been able 
to control for employment status, which is likely correlated with age, the 
marginal explanatory power of age might have been less.  
Does this diminish the argument that age is an important factor in the 
VRRS? Probably not. Regardless of whether age influences the risk score 
directly, through its inclusion in the algorithm, or indirectly, through its 
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correlation with other factors such as employment status, the fact remains 
that young people have much higher risk scores. Functionally, it makes little 
difference whether age affects the risk score by direct inclusion in the 
algorithm, or instead through age-proxies like lower employment. 
Figure 3 shows the overall explanatory power of seven different models. 
The full model, which contains all seven factors, has the most explanatory 
power, explaining 72% of the variation in the VRRS. A very close second, 
however, is a model that contains only two factors: age and the number of 
prior arrests. This model can explain 68% of the total variation. Figure 3 
also shows that age remains a potent factor even when combined with 
factors other than prior arrests. Finally, as we already indicated in Figure 1 
(and display again here), even on its own age explains 57% of the variation, 
while the model that contains only criminal history variables (current 
charge, juvenile justice, prior arrests and prior incarceration) only explains 
about 20% of the variation, and the model containing gender and race 
explains only 10% of the variation. 
 
Figure 3: The Overall Explanatory Power of Various Models 
 
Note: This figure shows the adjusted R^2 of various models: one that 
includes all factors, and six that include only a subset of factors. The 
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adjustment to the R^2 accounts for the number of regressors included in the 
model. 
 
As a way of bringing home the importance of age to risk assessment, 
Figure 4 shows the average risk score for defendants of each age.60 There is 
a strong inverse relationship between age and the VRRS. The average risk 
score declines as age increases, and this decline is particularly steep between 
the ages of eighteen and thirty. Eighteen year old defendants have risk 
scores that are, on average, twice as high as forty-year-old defendants. We 
also conducted a partial reverse-engineer of the COMPAS General 
Recidivism Risk Score (GRRS). We found that age is still a predictor, 
although the magnitude of influence is less than in the Violent Recidivism 
Risk Score. On the GRRS, age has individual explanatory power of 27% 
and marginal explanatory power of 23%. 
 
Figure 4: The Age and Risk Score Relationship 
 
 
                                                 
60. The raw risk score in the data is negatively signed, where zero is the highest risk and negative 
5 is the lowest risk. To avoid the confusion associated with a negatively signed risk score, we added five 
points to each score so that all scores are positive. 
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In sum, our analysis of the COMPAS shows that age is one of the most 
important factors in the instrument. Ideally, one would not have to reverse 
engineer the COMPAS to arrive at this conclusion. But we had to do so 
given its developer’s unwillingness to share its algorithm.61 
B. Age in Other Risk Assessment Tools 
The COMPAS algorithms are not the only risk assessment instruments 
in which age plays a large role. Among risk assessment tools that make their 
algorithm publicly available, many others place a heavy weight on age. 
Table 2 demonstrates this conclusion with respect to eight such instruments 
(some of which are more commonly used to aid pretrial detention decisions 
rather than sentencing determinations) by comparing the treatment of age 
with the treatment of criminal history.  
The table clearly shows that, in each case, age is as heavily weighted or 
more heavily weighted than the comparative criminal history measure. 
Column 3 of the table shows the difference in scores between an eighteen-
year-old and a fifty-year-old who are similar in all other respects. Column 
4 shows the number of points that various criminal history measures add to 
the defendant’s score. As a comparison of these two columns indicates, the 
influence of age is either identical to or greater than the influence of criminal 
history. For instance, in the PCRA, which is the risk assessment used at 
sentencing in the federal system, being eighteen adds two points to the risk 
score, the same number of points that are added for having three to six prior 
arrests. Among Virginia’s three instruments, age adds between four and six 
more points than criminal history. In short, an assessment relying on these 
instruments is heavily dependent on age.62  
                                                 
61. Equivant does acknowledge that age “carries a lot of weight in the Violent Recidivism Risk 
Score calculation” and that “if you are young, unemployed, and have an early age-at-first arrest and a 
history of supervision failure, you could score a medium or high on the Violence Risk Scale even though 
you never had a violent offense arrest.” Practitioner’s Guide to COMPAS, supra note 35, at 25–26.  
62. It should be noted, however, that age is not included in all risk assessment algorithms. The LSI-
R does not list age among its inputs, although many of its inputs, such as employment status, are likely 
correlated with age. See WASHINGTON STATE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY, SEX OFFENDER 
SENTENCING IN WASHINGTON STATE: PREDICTING RECIDIVISM BASED ON THE LSI-R (2006) (a list of 
individual LSI-R items in the technical appendix does not mention age). Neither the Ohio nor the Indiana 
Risk Assessment Community Supervision tools (used in sentencing) include age as a direct input. See 
EDWARD LATESSA ET. AL., CREATION AND VALIDATION OF THE OHIO RISK ASSESSMENT SYSTEM, 
FINAL REPORT 51–53 (2009); University of Cincinnati, INDIANA RISK ASSESSMENT SYSTEM 2-4, 2-5, 
2-6 (2010). The Ohio and Indiana Risk Assessment tools used to determine correctional facility 
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Table 2. Age in Various Risk Assessment Instruments  
Risk 
Assessment  
Type of 
Instrument 
Score for          
Being 18  
Score for 
Prior                    
Criminal 
History  
Prior Criminal 
History Specifics 
PCRA63 Federal post-
conviction 
2 2 Three to six prior 
arrests64 
Static-9965 Risk of sex 
offending, male 
2 1 Any number of prior 
violent (but non-sexual) 
convictions66 
PTRA67 Federal pretrial 2 2 Five or more prior 
felony convictions68 
VRAI - Fraud, 
Larceny69 
Virginia – 
Sentencing 
21 15 Three or more prior 
adult felony 
convictions70 
VRAI - Drug71 Virginia – 
Sentencing 
8 5 Three prior adult felony 
convictions72 
VRAI - Sex 
Offender73 
Virginia – 
Sentencing 
12 8 Two or more prior 
felony arrests and zero-
three prior 
misdemeanor arrests74 
PSA75 Arnold 
Foundation’s Public 
Safety Assessment - 
pretrial 
2 2 Three or more prior 
violent convictions76 
     
                                                 
placement and reentry do include age, but the weights associated with age are relatively low. LATESSA 
ET AL., supra, at 56, 60; UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI, supra, at 3-1, 4-1. 
63. Jennifer L. Skeem & Christopher T. Lowenkamp, Risk, Race, and Recidivism: Predictive Bias 
and Disparate Impact, 54 CRIMINOLOGY 680, 689 (2016). 
64. Id. 
65. Amy Phenix et al., Static-99R Coding Rules 46 (rev. 2016).  
66. Id. at 58. 
67. OFFICE OF PROBATION AND PRETRIAL SERV., FEDERAL PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT (PTRA) 
USER’S MANUAL AND SCORING GUIDE 1 (2010), https://www.pretrial.org/download/risk-assessment/ 
Federal%20Pretrial%20Risk%20Assessment%20Instrument%20(2010).pdf [https://perma.cc/J58K-P6 
63]. 
68. Id. 
69. VA. CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMM’N, FRAUD WORKSHEET (2017), www.vcsc.virginia.gov/ 
worksheets_2017/fraud.pdf [https://perma.cc/55BA-E4ZF]; VA. CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMM’N, 
LARCENY WORKSHEET (2017), https://www.vcsc.virginia.gov/worksheets_2017/Larceny.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/U97M-6JMQ]. 
70. See sources cited supra note 69. 
71. VA. CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMM’N, DRUG SCHEDULE I/II WORKSHEET (2017), http://www. 
vcsc.virginia.gov/worksheets_2017/SchI_II.pdf [https://perma.cc/U6RC-7WRP]. 
72. Id. 
73. VA. CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMM’N, RAPE WORKSHEET (2017), http://www.vcsc.virginia. 
gov/worksheets_2017/Rape_.pdf [https://perma.cc/98UM-7BTQ]. 
74. Id. 
75. Arnold Found., Public Safety Assessment, Risk Factors and Formula 3 (2016).  
76. Id. 
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The information depicted in Table 2 is publicly available for those who 
are willing to invest the time into searching it out. But, importantly, it is 
generally not made salient to the judge at the time of use. Unless the judge 
is numerically skilled and has memorized the weights on different factors, 
we expect that there is a less-than-perfect understanding of the impact 
different factors like age have on the risk score. That lack of transparency 
is a significant concern, especially at sentencing, where relative youth is 
generally supposed to be a mitigating factor.  
III. THE HIDDEN DANGERS OF THE DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD CONUNDRUM  
Young age is a highly influential factor in modern risk assessment 
instruments. But that influence is not immediately apparent from the risk 
scores that legal decision-makers use to make pretrial detention, sentencing, 
and release determinations. This lack of transparency means that decision-
makers may not realize the extent to which a high risk score is based on a 
factor that they may consider mitigating.   
The problem created by the opacity of these instruments goes much 
deeper than that, however. As Part I demonstrated, while a particular factor, 
such as youth or mental illness, might logically be considered both a 
culpability-mitigator and a risk-aggravator, it should never function as both 
a culpability-mitigator and culpability-aggravator. Yet, given the 
ambiguous nature of a high risk finding, that illegitimate conflation is 
precisely what might happen if the role of youth in risk assessment is not 
made obvious. After explaining the problem further, we explore ways of 
dealing with it. 
A. Risk Assessment as Character Judgement 
Consider two individuals. James is an eighteen-year-old male facing a 
marijuana possession charge. He has a pending charge (also for marijuana 
possession) and has failed to appear in court on one occasion. Carl is forty-
years-old, is facing a charge for aggravated assault, has two prior 
convictions (one for armed robbery and one for selling cocaine), and has 
spent two years in prison. As we have shown, it is very possible that James 
and Carl will receive the same score on the COMPAS VRRS assessment 
instrument. But while James’s high risk evaluation would largely be due to 
his age, Carl’s high risk evaluation would instead largely be due to his prior 
violent convictions. As implied by Table 4, violent crime rates drop 
considerably with age, so eighteen-year-olds with no history of violence 
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may actually have the same statistical risk of violence as forty-year-olds 
with multiple prior violent convictions.  
Is it important that the judge be aware of which factors contribute to high-
risk labels such as these? In particular, is it important that the judge know 
that James has received the “high risk of violent recidivism” label primarily 
because of his age? We think so, in part because of the way risk assessments 
are often perceived and used by judges and other decision-makers. 
Risk assessments convey more than information about statistical risk; 
whether intended or not, they are also often interpreted as statements about 
character. For instance, one routinely finds linkage of the defendant’s 
dangerousness with an assessment of his or her character in judicial 
decisions.77 Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has made the connection, when 
it stated in Deck v. Missouri that evidence of “danger to the community . . . 
almost inevitably affects adversely the jury’s perception of the character of 
the defendant.”78 This type of pronouncement reflects the intuition that a 
statement about someone’s propensity for committing a violent offense can 
easily be interpreted as a statement about that person’s intrinsic worth. 
In Deck, the Supreme Court went on to say that “character and 
propensities of the defendant are part of a ‘unique, individualized judgment 
regarding the punishment that a particular person deserves.’”79 Many 
commentators have likewise observed that character is closely related to 
blameworthiness and desert. For instance, Professor Peter Arenella has 
argued that there is no means of judging persons charged with crime except 
through assessing their character.80 Professor James Whitman has 
contended that consideration of character “makes it possible to consider the 
full spectrum of information about individual blameworthiness, including 
                                                 
77. Sherron v. State, 2017 WL 6521705 *2 (Ind. App. 2017) (upholding a sentence because of a 
finding of the offender’s “character as being ‘predatory, disturbing, dangerous’”); State v. Bell, 33 A.3d 
167, 181 (Conn. 2011) (speaking of the “public’s interest in protecting itself from dangerous criminals 
and in imposing a fair sentence on the basis of the defendant’s history and character”); Casillas v. State, 
941 N.E.2d 572 *3 (Ind. App. 2011) (unpublished table decision) (upholding sentence because of the 
offender’s “violent and recklessly dangerous character”); State v. Day, 551 N.W.2d 871 *1 (Wisc. 1996) 
(unpublished table decision) (describing the offender’s sentence as based on the offender’s “crime, 
character, and dangerousness”). 
78. 544 U.S. 622, 633 (2005) (“[t]he appearance of the offender during the penalty phase in 
shackles . . . almost inevitably implies to a jury, as a matter of common sense, that court authorities 
consider the offender a danger to the community—often a statutory aggravator and nearly always a 
relevant factor in jury decisionmaking . . . [and] almost inevitably affects adversely the jury’s perception 
of the character of the defendant.”). 
79. Id. (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 900 (1983). 
80. Peter Arenella, Character, Choice and Moral Agency: The Relevance of Character to Our 
Moral Culpability Judgments, 7 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 59 (1990). 
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both dangerousness and deservingness.”81 And Professor Kyron Huigens 
has developed an aretaic theory of punishment that views the criminal 
justice system primarily as a means of judging and improving character.82 
If a risk assessment is interpreted as an assessment of character, and if 
judges and other sentencing authorities believe that character is closely 
related to blameworthiness, then inclusion of youth in a risk assessment tool 
becomes particularly problematic. Return to the examples of Carl, the forty- 
year-old assault offender with a history of armed robbery, and James, the 
young marijuana user. Carl’s choice to commit serious crimes in the past 
might reasonably be seen as an expression of bad character that can be used 
in aggravation whether the focus of sentencing is risk or blameworthiness. 
In contrast, it obviously is not correct to say that James’s young age alone 
is indicative of bad character. Nonetheless, that is precisely what sentencing 
authorities signify when they allow their sentencing decisions to be 
determined by algorithms that place so much weight on youthfulness. 
Furthermore, if the sentencing authority does in fact enhance James’s 
sentence based on character inferences drawn from the “high risk of violent 
recidivism” label, it is engaging in the worse sort of double-edged 
swordism. As we noted above, as a logical matter youth may be both a 
mitigator and an aggravator if its use in aggravation is focused solely on 
future behavior. But if youth is instead used as an indicator of bad character 
and not just as an indicator of high risk, it has been associated with moral 
condemnation. This is, of course, in direct contradiction to the traditional 
position—reinforced by the Supreme Court’s kids-are-different 
jurisprudence—that youth diminishes culpability.  
This double-edged sword problem is exacerbated when the risk 
assessment is based on an instrument like the COMPAS, because of that 
instrument’s lack of transparency. In using such a tool, judges might 
unknowingly and unintentionally use youth as a blame-aggravator. A judge 
who is aware of the defendant’s youth may consider it partially excusing, 
due to the reduced culpability of youth. But if that same offender is 
denominated “high-risk” and the judge, unaware that this label is heavily 
influenced by the defendant’s youthful age, interprets it as a statement of 
bad character, then youthfulness unwittingly contributes simultaneously to 
moral condemnation. That result is both illogical and unacceptable.  
                                                 
81. James Q. Whitman, The Case for Penal Modernism: Beyond Utility and Desert, 1 CRITICAL 
ANALYSIS L. 143, 178 (2014). 
82. Kyron Huigens, The Dead End of Deterrence, and Beyond, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 943, 
1022–34 (2000) 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol96/iss3/6
  
 
 
 
 
2018] ALGORITHMIC RISK ASSESSMENT 703 
 
 
 
 
B. The Need for Transparency 
This is not the first paper to call for greater transparency in risk 
assessment use. Other authors who have written about algorithmic decision-
making have argued that biases in data collection and analysis cannot be 
exposed unless courts or some other supervisory authority has access to the 
underlying code.83 To these contentions, we add a new argument for 
transparency in the criminal justice setting, one based on the potential for 
unexamined risk assessments to produce results that are inconsistent with 
the avowed purposes of criminal punishment.  
To understand the need for transparency, consider the risk assessment 
process in Virginia, one of the leading states in using risk assessment 
instruments at sentencing. As Table 2’s analysis indicates, youth plays a 
significant role in the assessment tools Virginia judges use. Yet these judges 
may not realize that fact; indeed, a recent survey of Virginia judges 
indicated that only 29% reported being “very familiar” with their risk 
assessment tool, and 22% were either “unfamiliar” or only “slightly 
familiar” with it.84 Given these statistics, it is unlikely that most Virginia 
judges fully comprehend the role that youthfulness plays in their risk 
instrument. The matter is exacerbated by the fact that risk scores in Virginia 
are paired with explicit sentencing-directives; for example, the state’s 
sentencing guidelines recommend that judges divert non-violent offenders 
who are rated “low risk.”85 While judges retain discretion as to whether to 
follow such directives, they are not apprised of how the risk scores are 
produced unless they specifically ask for such information.86   
Furthermore, to avoid the problems we have identified, simply making 
public the factors included in the risk assessment will not be enough. That 
limited type of transparency will make it too easy for judges to conclude 
                                                 
83. See generally, FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT 
CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 4 (2015); Lilian Edwards & Michael Veale, Enslaving the 
Algorithm: From a “Right to an Explanation” to a “Right to Better Decisions”? 16 IEEE Security & 
Privacy 46 (2018); Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the 
Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343 (2018); Elizabeth E. Joh, The Undue Influence of 
Surveillance Technology Companies on Policing, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 101 (2017).  
84. JOHN MONAHAN ET. AL., NONVIOLENT RISK ASSESSMENT IN VIRGINIA SENTENCING, REPORT 
2: A SURVEY OF CIRCUIT COURT JUDGES 7 (2018) https://content.law.virginia.edu/system/files/news/ 
spr18/Judges%20sentencing%20survey%20March%201.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PSN-5V8R]. 
85. Kevin R. Reitz, “Risk Discretion” at Sentencing, 30 FED. SENT’G REP. 68, 70 (2017). 
86. Further, their decisions are non-appealable. Luttrell v. Commonwealth, 592 S.E.2d 752, 755 
(Va. App. 2004) (“[A] trial judge’s failure to correctly apply the sentencing guidelines ‘shall not be 
reviewable on appeal or the basis of any other post-conviction relief’.”). 
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that, since age is one among many risk factors, its inclusion in the instrument 
raises no important issues.87 In contrast, if judges are made fully aware of 
how influential age is in the risk score—how, for instance, it accounts for 
almost 60% of variation in some risk assessment algorithms—their reaction 
is likely to be very different. With this additional information, judges will 
be in a better position to balance the mitigating and the aggravating aspects 
of youth. 
Fortunately, this situation can be remedied in large part by providing 
legal actors with relevant and easily interpretable information about how 
specific risk factors are weighted.88 This type of transparency may be 
possible even for instruments that are proprietary, if the relevant company 
is willing to surrender limited control over its code. For instance, the risk 
score could be conveyed along with information about only the most 
important factors. The judge would be informed “The defendant’s risk score 
is A, and the three most influential contributing factors are X, Y, and Z.”89  
To return to James and Carl, the judge might be informed that the most 
important factors in the risk score for James are age, the pending charge, 
and the prior failure to appear. For Carl, the judge would be told that the 
paramount factors are the current violent charge, the prior violent 
convictions, and the prior incarceration. Such information would likely go 
a long way towards alleviating the potential conflation of blame and risk 
that we have identified. 
One could, of course, ask for more. For instance, courts could be told the 
precise number of points associated with the most important risk factors. 
For algorithms that have a relatively small number of inputs—a dozen or 
less, say—it would be tractable to inform the judge of how much every 
characteristic adds to the risk score for a particular defendant. At the same 
time, for ease of use the factors that are most heavily weighted could be 
highlighted.  
                                                 
87. An example of this phenomenon is found in State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 767 (Wisc. 
2016) (upholding a sentence based in part on a risk assessment that included gender because the trial 
court considered “multiple factors”).  
88. The tools we discuss here are not the product of artificial intelligence or machine, which pose 
greater obstacles to interpretability. See generally, Michael L. Rich, Machine Learning, Automated 
Algorithms, and the Fourth Amendment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 871, 883–86 (2016). But even here some 
level of transparency is possible. See generally Joshua A. Kroll, et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. 
PA. L. REV. 633 (2017). 
89. There are multiple ways of defining which factors are “most influential” in determining a risk 
score. The most effective method likely depends on the specifics of the tool and the context. 
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Private companies might not be willing to surrender their entire code in 
this way, however.90 And some may be unwilling even to reveal the most 
important risk factors at issue. Arguments can and have been made—based 
on the right of confrontation or due process—that courts should be able to 
force them to do so.91 We will not canvass those arguments here; suffice it 
to say that we believe they are convincing. If such arguments fail, states that 
wish to continue using risk assessments could and should develop their own 
algorithms.92 
The type of transparency that would ameliorate the concerns addressed 
in this paper requires neither a change in risk instrument used, nor a radical 
departure in practice. As a technical matter, the necessary procedure is 
relatively easy to implement. Legal barriers may be more substantial, but 
should not stand in the way if accurate and fair sentencing is the goal.  
C. Other Risk Factors 
Some risk factors are likely to be aggravating from either a backward-
looking retributive perspective or a forward-looking risk perspective. The 
most obvious example is criminal history. Repeated criminal conduct 
suggests both that a person is more culpable and higher risk.93 Other, more 
contentious examples in this vein might include membership in a gang and 
failure to complete a previously-imposed rehabilitation program.94 While 
transparency is probably always preferred, it is not as important with respect 
to these factors because the high-risk label and its evocation of bad character 
will not improperly hide or misuse a blame-mitigator.  
A different response is necessary, however, with risk factors that, like 
youth, are best described as mitigators when viewed from a retributive 
perspective. If the courts have explicitly made such a determination, as they 
seem to have done with mental illness, then the double-edged sword 
problem we have described in connection with youth arises once again. 
                                                 
90. For instance, Equivant, the creator of COMPAS, has refused to do so. 
91. See sources cited supra note 83. 
92. Pennsylvania, for instance, has done so. See Rhys Hester, The Pennsylvania Experience with 
Risk Assessment Sentencing, in RISK AND RETRIBUTION: THE ETHICS AND CONSEQUENCES OF 
PREDICTIVE SENTENCING (Jan W. de Keijsser, Julian V. Roberts & Jesper Ryberg, eds., forthcoming). 
93. Julian Roberts & Richard Frase, Predictive Sentencing: The Problematic Role of Prior Record 
Enhancements, in RISK AND RETRIBUTION, supra note 92. 
94. See Kevin S. Douglas & Christopher D. Webster, The HCR-20 Violence Risk Assessment 
Scheme: Concurrent Validity in a Sample of Incarcerated Offenders, 26 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 3, 8 
(1999) (describing the HCR-20 risk assessment instrument, which includes treatment failures as a risk 
factor). 
 
 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
706 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [VOL. 96:681 
 
 
 
 
Thus, when such factors are treated as risk-enhancing in a risk assessment 
instrument, that fact must be made known to the sentencing judge so that its 
contribution to the risk appraisal can be balanced by its mitigating impact, 
and not obscured by a generic risk score.  
Other risk factors are more difficult to characterize. Consider substance 
abuse. While substance abuse is usually considered a significant risk 
factor,95 it could also easily be viewed as a blame-mitigator.96 A number of 
other potential risk factors—including a history of unemployment, a lack of 
education, and one’s residence—could be seen as blame-mitigators as 
well,97 depending on the sentencing authority’s view of how much control 
individuals have over such circumstances and how much they contributed 
to the offender’s crime. This is a large issue which we will not tackle here.98 
But if these types of factors are included in a risk assessment tool, the 
difficulty of categorizing them argues for the same type of transparency that 
is clearly required when youth is the risk factor at issue.  
CONCLUSION 
The use of risk assessment tools in criminal justice is expanding rapidly. 
In this article we do not take a position on whether that is a good or bad 
development. Rather, assuming that risk assessment will be a significant 
feature in many sentencing regimes, we have argued that factors that are 
meant to mitigate blame—clearly youth, likely mental illness, and possibly 
many more—can only be treated that way if sentencing judges are given full 
information about the extent to which risk assessments instruments rely on 
them.  
 
                                                 
95. See id.; see also Seena Fazel et al., Prediction of Violent Reoffending on Release from Prison: 
Derivation and External Validation of a Scalable Tool, 3 LANCET PSYCHIATRY 535, 537 (2016), both of 
which designate substance abuse as a risk factor. 
96. For instance, although the number has dwindled in recent years, several states recognize a 
voluntary intoxication defense. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL Law 498–501 (5th ed. 2010). 
97. Several authors have argued, for instance, for a “rotten social background” defense. See, e.g., 
Richard Delgado, The Wretched of the Earth, 2 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 2, 22 (2011) (“[U]ntil we 
loosen the bonds that inhibit upward mobility, we have no business punishing the wretched of the earth 
who find themselves trapped in the bottom layers of society and, predictably, grow up without many 
controls or options.”); Andrew Taslitz, The Rule of Criminal Law: Why Courts and Legislatures Ignore 
Richard Delgado’s Rotten Social Background, 2 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV 80, 129 (2011) (“The rotten 
social background defense calls us to a more inclusive, realistic, compassionate, and equal form of moral 
and legal rule.”). 
98. One of us has argued that unless these types of factors contribute significantly to the risk score, 
they should not be included in risk assessment instruments. Christopher Slobogin, Principles of Risk 
Assessment: Sentencing and Policing, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 583, 592–93 (2018). 
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